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W
ORKERS’ RIGHTS ARE A CONTENTIOUS PART of the
public debate surrounding the enactment of Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs). Labor rights advocates
criticize these trade regimes for reflecting a zealous
pursuit of trade and investment deregulation without creating an insti-
tutional infrastructure sufficiently protective of workers’ basic needs,
such as respectful treatment, high work and safety standards, livable
wages and benefits, and rights of association and collective bargaining.
Opponents of current FTAs assert that while international free trade
may bring certain benefits to a national economy, workers often bear
a disproportionate burden because low labor standards, amid compe-
tition for scarce investment capital, offer developing countries a com-
parative economic advantage. The predicted result is that both devel-
oping and developed countries engage in a zero-sum race towards
labor market deregulation. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which became effective in 1994, was the first
FTA to acknowledge the nexus between free trade and the diminish-
ing social and economic protections for workers. The United States,
Mexico, and Canada negotiated a side agreement to the NAFTA, the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), with a
stated resolve to “protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights.”
Subsequent FTAs entered into by the United States with Jordan
(“U.S.-Jordan”) in 2001, Singapore (“U.S.-Singapore”) in 2003, and
Chile (“U.S.-Chile”), also in 2003, have reinforced this linkage.
Unfortunately, the vaguely worded principles and commitments to
labor rights of these FTAs beg questions as to their effectiveness and
significance.
Although the above agreements have taken important steps in the
process of institutionalizing and articulating the free trade/labor rights
nexus, they are wholly inadequate if they do not lead to stronger pro-
tections. The objective of this article is to make FTA texts quickly
accessible, to provide a critical tool with which to analyze FTAs, and to
recognize opportunities for and obstacles to strengthening labor protec-
tions. The strategy will be to illuminate the substance of these FTAs
with an eye towards strengthening labor provisions in future agree-
ments, an especially urgent task in light of the current trend to create
larger free trade regimes such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). The FTAA is a hemisphere-wide trade and investment agenda
that has thus far made no effort to address workers’ rights.
PARSING THE TEXTS: INCOMPLETE COMMITMENTS
THE NAALC, U.S.-JORDAN, AND U.S.-SINGAPORE contain five
components that are crucial to an understanding of their effectiveness:
(1) standing; (2) enforcement and remedies; (3) substantive law; (4)
transparency and public awareness (sometimes called “sunshine”); and
(5) cooperative activities. Analyzing the labor provisions of an FTA
text with these five components in mind provides an overall picture of
their value for workers’ rights advocates.
STANDING
On the whole, the opportunities for private individuals to invoke
the enforcement mechanisms of the NAALC, U.S.-Jordan, and U.S.-
Singapore range from limited to non-existent. Each FTA requires
Party governments (“Parties”) to create “contact points” or offices that
have a duty to receive public input or communications from the pri-
vate sector. The FTAs provide no specifics as to what is to be done
with public comments, except for a requirement that these “contact
points” exist and that certain discretionary procedural elements, estab-
lished at the discretion of the governments, be satisfied. Moreover, the
FTAs deny each country the authority to create a private right of
action enforceable in their domestic courts for violations of the agree-
ment by another Party. In other words, if the U.S. fails to effectively
enforce its labor laws as required by U.S.-Jordan, a Jordanian may not
file suit against the U.S. in Jordanian courts. 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES
The NAALC Labyrinth
While these FTAs establish complicated and legalistic enforce-
ment procedures, each fails to provide remedies for workers who suf-
fer from violations of domestic law. Other groups, such as investors,
can demand money damages. NAFTA, for example, provides individ-
ual investors with clear recourse to money damages while the NAALC
denies any remedy to aggrieved workers. Through its labyrinthine pro-
visions, the NAALC essentially establishes a three-tiered system of
enforcement: submissions, evaluation, and arbitration. The complaint
process begins at National Administrative Offices (NAOs) which,
among other functions, serve as the contact point for public submis-
sions. The NAALC, however, does not mandate procedures for the
submission process but instead gives each NAO the authority to estab-
lish its own rules of procedure. 
In the U.S. NAO, once submissions have been accepted for
review, the process looks much like a trial with the features of investi-
gation, a public hearing, and a final report with recommendations.
However, these reports do not lead to enforceable judgments, effec-
tively leaving the prospect of a negotiated solution between the Parties
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as the de facto ruling. For example, if a group of Canadian workers
were to allege that Canada failed to enforce their right to organize, the
U.S. NAO may very well determine that a violation occurred and rec-
ommend that the Parties negotiate a solution. However, the NAO can
do no more than this. To date, NAOs have received twenty-six public
communications and the Party-negotiated outcomes, while at times
filled with symbolic value, have been composed of less than imposing
remedies, such as seminars, conferences, reports and outreach sessions.
Although these outcomes may raise awareness of the workers’ plights,
they do not effectively respond to the abuses of their rights. 
While in practice no case has yet moved
beyond this first stage of enforcement, the
NAALC authorizes Parties to seek further
analysis through an Evaluation Committee of
Experts (ECE) as the second step in enforce-
ment. If an ECE determines that it has juris-
diction over a particular matter, it will make
non-binding recommendations to which
Parties must respond in writing. After anoth-
er round of consultations aimed at reaching a
resolution, a Party may move to the third tier
of enforcement and request the formation of
an arbitration panel made up of three labor
law “experts.” In theory, where an arbitral
panel finds a violation of the relevant labor
standards, the Parties are encouraged to agree
on an “action plan” to remedy the situation.
If no such accord can be reached or imple-
mented, the arbitral panel “may” be reconvened with the power to
“impose a monetary enforcement assessment.” This power is entirely
discretionary, and a fine may not exceed $20 million (U.S.), regardless
of the nature of the violation. For the sake of perspective, private com-
panies have recovered up to $16.7 million (U.S.) for violations of the
NAFTA’s far-reaching investment chapter. Additionally, in the unlike-
ly event that such a fine would be imposed, the money is not paid to
the workers whose rights have been violated but rather into a “fund”
that is used to improve labor law enforcement by the violating Party.
Finally, if a Party refuses to pay a monetary assessment, the complaining
Party may suspend related “NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater
than that sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment.”
The NAALC’s evaluation and arbitration procedures, limited
though they are by the available substantive law described below, do
contain some teeth. Since these procedures are only available to gov-
ernments, however, they ultimately pose little threat to employers who
exploit vulnerable workers. Workers who suffer actual harms have no
ability to directly utilize the final two tiers of enforcement, which have
sat completely idle since their creation in 1994. 
Moving Away from the NAALC: 
U.S.-Jordan and U.S.-Singapore
U.S.-Jordan is more generous to workers than the NAALC, but
is limited in its own ways. Unlike the NAALC, one dispute settlement
mechanism governs the entire agreement. Workers and workers’ rights
activists, who argued for the inclusion of labor standards within the
main body of the FTA, considered this to be a significant though lim-
ited gain. When a conflict arises over the operation or interpretation
of the agreement, a Party may request consultations with the other
Party which, if unsuccessful, will be referred to the Joint Committee
created to oversee the entire agreement. If the Joint Committee can-
not settle the matter, a dispute settlement panel will attempt to resolve
the issue. After a final intervention by the Joint Committee, the com-
plaining Party can “take any appropriate and commensurate measure”
if the problem persists. This phrase implies that a Party could go so far
as to suspend trade benefits under appropriate circumstances. The
process is certainly less cumbersome procedurally and broader in scope
than the NAALC, but it does not provide for public initiation of com-
plaints.
In contrast to U.S.-Jordan, however, U.S.-Singapore strictly lim-
its the type of issues that can be the subject of consultations and dis-
pute settlement under the agreement. Where consultations have been
unsuccessful, the complaining Party can refer
the matter to the Joint Committee. In turn, if
the Joint Committee cannot resolve the dis-
pute, a Party can request the formation of dis-
pute settlement panel which will eventually
issue a final report to the parties. If the panel
finds that there has been a violation of the
agreement, the Parties should attempt to
resolve it through negotiations. If no such res-
olution is possible, then the panel will  recon-
vene to impose an annual monetary assess-
ment, which is capped at $15 million (U.S.)
per year, on the party complained against. If
the assessment is not paid, the complaining
party may impose trade sanctions “as neces-
sary to collect the assessment, while bearing in
mind the Agreement’s objective of eliminating
barriers to bilateral trade.” The agreement also
establishes a “Labor Cooperation Mechanism” which is meant to over-
see general principles, facilitate consultations between Parties, and
make non-binding recommendations related to labor issues. 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The NAALC Bottleneck
Each agreement strictly delimits the substance of available labor
protections. Within the NAALC, each stage of enforcement imposes
new conditions and restrictions on the enforceable substantive law.
NAOs may accept for review submissions covering a broad range of
issues in “relation to the other Party’s labor law, its administration, or
labor market conditions in its territory.” For instance, many of the
submissions accepted at the NAO level have involved core worker
rights like the right to organize and freedom of association. However,
once a Party requests the establishment of an ECE, the relevant law
narrows dramatically. An ECE can only analyze “patterns of practice
by each Party in the enforcement of its occupational safety and health
or other technical labor standards as they apply to the particular mat-
ter considered” in earlier ministerial consultations. Two caveats further
constrain the applicable law: the “pattern of practice” must be trade-
related and “mutually-recognized labor laws” must govern the practice
in question. 
Such limitations mean that Mexico cannot dispute individual vio-
lations of labor laws in the U.S., but only those labor standards protect-
ed by law in both countries. Facial challenges of unfair laws and com-
plaints about the absence of certain labor protections are simply not rel-
evant before an ECE, were one to ever be formed. The definition of
“technical labor standards” refers to a short list of labor laws and regu-
lations that pertain to prohibitions against forced labor, child-labor
laws, minimum employment standards (like minimum wage), employ-
ment discrimination, equality of pay between genders, occupational
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health, compensation for injuries and protection of migrant workers.
For example, an ECE could only investigate an allegation that the U.S.
government was not enforcing its child labor laws if the complaining
Party, for instance Mexico, also had child labor laws. Moreover, Mexico
could only request an ECE if it alleged that the U.S. was persistently
failing to live up to its own standards. Mexico could not complain that
the U.S.’ child labor laws did not sufficiently protect children.
A bottleneck occurs at the arbitration, or third stage of the
enforcement mechanism. At this stage, Parties may only discuss com-
plaints addressing a “persistent pattern of failure” to “effectively
enforce” a Party’s domestic law relating to “occupational safety and
health, child labor, and minimum wage technical labor standards” that
were the subject matter of the pertinent ECE report. Another con-
straint accentuates the bottleneck. An accused country may argue pur-
suant to Article 49 that its alleged failure to enforce “reflects a reason-
able exercise of [the government’s] discretion with respect to prosecu-
torial, regulatory, or compliance matters” or “results from bona fide
decisions to allocate resources to enforcement” of other labor matters
that are a higher priority. For example, if Canada accused Mexico of
failing to enforce child labor laws in its textile industry, Mexico could
argue that its resources were better spent on the promotion of safer
working conditions in maquiladoras. 
Only the Bare Essentials: U.S.-Jordan and U.S.-
Singapore
Determining the substantive law of the U.S.-Jordan FTA is sim-
pler than with the NAALC. There is no tiered process that limits the
scope of applicable law depending on the stage of enforcement. Parties
have two obligations: (1) they must “strive to ensure” that their
domestic laws protect five enumerated labor rights (right of associa-
tion, right to organize and bargain collectively, no forced labor, no
child labor, and minimum wages, hours of work and occupational
safety and health), and (2) they must “not fail to effectively enforce”
their laws with respect to these enumerated labor rights. Like the
NAALC, violations must be trade-related and systematic to be
enforceable, and bona fide decisions regarding the allocations of
resources provide a defense. The five listed labor rights are more nar-
row than the NAALC’s eleven principles of labor, but they can be car-
ried further through the enforcement process.
The substantive law in U.S.-Singapore is even more limited than
in the above agreements. Although the actionable laws in U.S.-
Singapore are virtually identical to U.S.-Jordan, no other labor-relat-
ed complaints may be the subject of consultations or dispute resolu-
tion. This distinction can be significant. For example, while the “strive
to ensure” language in U.S.-Jordan may be vague, it could be the basis
for a complaint because all aspects of that agreement are subject to its
dispute resolution mechanisms. For labor-related misconduct under
U.S.-Singapore, a failure to “strive to ensure” labor standards in accor-
dance with the minimum set out in the agreement could not be raised
between the Parties as a complaint.
TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
“Sunshine,” or public awareness of labor rights violations, deters
abusive employment practices, though its effectiveness is dubious
when unsupported by robust enforcement provisions. Article 1 of the
NAALC admonishes the Parties to “foster transparency in the admin-
istration of labor law” as an objective of the agreement. To this end,
the NAALC calls on each Party to “ensure” that any administrative,
quasi-judicial, or judicial hearings on labor enforcement be open to
the public and transparent. Each Party must also make its laws, regu-
lations, procedures and administrative rulings available in a way that
allows interested persons to become “acquainted with them.” However
impressive these tentative attempts to foster transparency and educa-
tion may appear, Parties and the institutional bodies created by the
agreement retain almost complete discretion in making decisions or
reports produced under the NAALC publicly available. 
While the substantive commitment to transparency may seem
insincere under the NAALC, U.S.-Jordan makes both motive and
function clear: there is simply no mention of transparency or public
information at all. Perhaps aware of the political currency that attends
such terminology, U.S.-Singapore devotes Article 17.3 to “procedural
guarantees and public awareness,” calling generally for transparent
administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial processes. Significantly, the
agreement offers no further explanation. However, the Parties may, at
their discretion, make public decisions concerning implementation of
any provision of the labor chapter.
COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES
The NAALC promotes “cooperative activities” among the Parties
and, while no mention is made of these in U.S.-Jordan, they have
reappeared in U.S.-Singapore and other recently enacted FTAs. Over
the last ten years, the NAALC Council and NAOs have sponsored
many seminars, studies, and public events geared towards providing
the public, NGOs, and government officials with information about
the legal systems and labor conditions in each of the three countries.
Topics have included, among others, the conditions of migrant agri-
cultural workers in the U.S., the rights of working women in North
America, and occupational health and safety. At least one author has
suggested that these efforts have “deepened the reservoir of compara-
tive labor law and industrial relations expertise among the three coun-
tries…[and] have encouraged development of a tri-national web of
contacts” among labor unions, NGOs, governments, and employers.
Such an optimistic judgment seems easy to dismiss. However, in the
absence of more substantive remedial measures, it is worth noting that
cross-border organizing, increased public awareness, and a better
understanding of foreign legal systems will be an integral part of any
movement to secure and protect workers’ rights in the global economy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
IT IS IMPORTANT TO ARTICULATE A THOUGHTFUL CRITIQUE of
the many ways in which FTAs fail to protect workers. Workers’ rights
advocates, however, must challenge the hollow provisions of current
agreements by offering concrete alternatives. Policy makers need a rich
literature of possibilities to draw upon. Some general suggestions fol-
low: (1) FTA architects must develop truly multinational complaint
processes accessible to aggrieved workers, as well as their governments;
(2) FTAs need to incorporate labor provisions into the main texts of
the agreements without prejudicial caveats, especially in the context of
remedies; (3) states parties should integrate labor standards into the
agreements regardless of domestic law and encourage cross-national
understanding of domestic laws and labor conditions; and finally, (4)
procedural commitments to public awareness should invoke tough
penalties if ignored. 
The 1994 enactment of the NAALC was a watershed event for
workers’ rights advocates, and the integration of the U.S.-Jordan labor
provisions into the main text of the FTA might, in fact, be a step for-
ward. Nonetheless, the reality is that current FTAs offer no real relief
and scant hope to workers struggling against the free trade mantra
“labor market flexibility.”   HRB
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